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On 21 August 2015 the UK carried out a targeted killing of a British citizen, 
Reyaad Khan, by an RAF drone strike in Syria. Reyaad Khan was suspected of 
involvement in plotting and directing terrorist attacks in the UK and elsewhere. He 
and two others were killed by a Hellfire missile fired from a Reaper drone. UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron in a speech to Parliament on 7 September 2015 said that this 
was the first time that a British military asset had been used in a country in which the 
UK was not involved in a war; it was “a new departure”. He said, “I want to be clear 
that the strike was not part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria: it was a 
targeted strike to deal with a clear, credible and specific terrorist threat to our country 
at home.” Was this in fact a major change by the UK? Has the UK now joined Israel 
and the USA as a state that carries out targeted killings off the hot battlefield? If so, 
what exactly is its new policy? These questions are complicated because the 
Government did not present a coherent position on the killing of Reyaad Khan. On the 
same day that the Prime Minister said that it was “a new departure” and not part of 
coalition military action in Syria, the UK offered a rather different explanation in the 
UN Security Council. Its letter reporting the targeted killing under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter said that the UK had undertaken military action in Syria “against an ISIL 
vehicle in which a target known to be actively engaged in planning and directing 
imminent armed attacks against the UK was travelling” in exercise of the inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defence (and so as part of the US-led action in 
Syria).1 Thus the Government presented conflicting explanations of the military action. 
The striking difference between the positions is partly explicable because of the 
different audiences addressed. 
Following the drone attack, the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights decided to 
conduct an inquiry to achieve clarification on a number of important questions, 
including (1) what precisely is the Government’s policy, and (2) what is its legal basis. 
One of the Committee’s main objectives was to clarify whether the drone strike in 
Syria heralded the adoption of a new policy of targeted killing of suspected terrorists 
abroad. “This matters because the UK has never previously had an explicit policy of 
using lethal force abroad outside an area of armed conflict.”2 It had consistently 
rejected the legality of “extrajudicial killing”. Section 2 of the Committee’s Report on 
The Government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing deals with this issue 
of whether there has been a change of policy by the UK.3 
As regards the particular targeted killing of Reyaad Khan, the “contradictions and 
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inconsistencies” in the Government’s position had given rise to confusion as to 
whether there really was a new departure and, if so, what was its nature. The 
Committee considered three different issues: first, was there a new departure in terms 
of the UK constitutional convention that the Government should consult Parliament 
before undertaking military action abroad; second, did the particular incident 
constitute a new departure in that it was now part of the Government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy to use lethal force against suspected terrorists abroad who 
pose an imminent threat to the UK, even in countries where the UK is not involved in 
an armed conflict; third, was there a new departure in the sense that the UK 
Government had adopted a general policy of targeted killing outside an armed 
conflict?   
The confusion arose because of the direct contradiction between the UK’s letter  to 
the Security Council (implying that the targeted killing was part of the coalition 
military operation in Syria because it was done in the exercise of collective 
self-defence) and the Prime Minister’s statement that it was a new departure, and not 
part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria. If the targeted killing was - as 
the UK implied to the UN Security Council - part of an ongoing armed conflict in 
Syria, then it would not in fact mark a change of policy by the UK despite the 
language of the Prime Minister. It would be consistent with UK practice of using 
drones to kill identified individuals in the ongoing armed conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The Committee seemed very willing to explain away the Prime Minister’s 
statement on the basis of his concern with the constitutional convention: the Prime 
Minister was keen to establish that he had not ignored the will of the House of 
Commons, and therefore he did not want to say that the UK had joined in coalition 
military action in Syria without Parliamentary approval.  
The background was that in August 2013, at a time of widespread concern about the 
use of chemical weapons in Syria, the UK House of Commons had refused to 
authorize the use of force in Syria. The UK Government had sought Parliamentary 
support for the use of force in the name of humanitarian intervention to prevent the 
alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad government in Syria, but Parliament 
had rejected this request.4 And in 2014 when the USA began to carry out air strikes 
first in Iraq and then in Syria on the basis that it was acting in collective self-defence 
of Iraq, the UK took part only in operations in Iraq. The House of Commons did not 
endorse UK air strikes in Syria; in September 2014 it voted in favour of action against 
ISIL in Iraq, but it expressly resolved that air strikes in Syria would need a separate 
vote in Parliament. It said “this motion does not endorse UK air strikes in Syria as part 
of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be subject to a separate vote in 
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Parliament.”5 
When the UK nevertheless carried out the targeted killing by a drone in Syria in 
August 2015, there was a call for an explanation: how was this compatible with 
Parliament’s earlier refusal of authority? The Report did not see any problem. The 
recently established UK constitutional convention required that Parliament be given an 
opportunity to discuss any proposed use of military force, except when there is an 
emergency which means that it would not be appropriate to consult the House of 
Commons in advance.6 Examples of such exceptions were cases where there is a 
critical British national interest at stake or where considerations of secrecy make it 
impossible. In this regard the Report expressly concluded that there had been a new 
departure in terms of the domestic constitutional convention governing the use of 
force abroad: this was the first time since the establishment of that convention that the 
Government had invoked the exception recognized by the convention, by using 
military force against ISIL not only outside the area (Iraq) authorized by the House of 
Commons, but in the very area (Syria) where the use of force had been expressly 
excluded by the terms of the authorizing resolution. That is, this “new departure” was 
of significance mainly for UK constitutional law, and also for the wider debate about 
the democratic accountability of Governments in decision-making on the use of force.  
On the second question as to whether the targeted killing of Reyaad Khan marked a 
new departure, the Committee discounted the statement of the Prime Minister on 7 
September 2015 that it was not part of the coalition operation in Syria, and accepted 
the Government’s claim that the targeted killing in Syria was indeed part of the same 
armed conflict in which the UK was already involved in Iraq. Therefore the particular 
action, the targeted killing of Reyaad Khan, was not a new departure; it was not a 
targeted killing outside armed conflict. The Committee considered the crucial issue of 
whether the UK was in fact involved in such an armed conflict in one brief paragraph 
in Chapter 3 of its Report. Its willingness to accept the Government’s assertions on 
this point is open to question; it gave no real explanation for its view.7 Was there a 
non-international armed conflict in Syria because the UK was involved in an armed 
conflict with ISIL in Iraq at the request of the government of Iraq and because ISIL 
operated in both states, even though the UK was not taking military action in Syria 
before its drone strike? The significance of this question is clear: if there is a 
non-international armed conflict between ISIL and the UK in Syria, the law of armed 
conflict rather than the stricter requirements of human rights law would apply to the 
targeted killing of Reyaad Khan.8 The UK Government view of the geographical 
scope of the non-international armed conflict between the UK and ISIL still accepts 
that the conflict is territorially limited to Iraq and Syria. The UK does not go as far as 
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the USA which has since the terrorist attacks of  9/11 taken the controversial position 
that its “global war on terror” (President Bush), and then its war on AlQaida (President 
Obama), and now its armed conflict with ISIL, have all formed part of a single global 
non-international armed conflict.9  
However, the Joint Committee’s Report was not concerned to consider the legality 
of the particular targeted killing; its main focus was on the third question identified 
above, the question whether it is now the UK Government’s policy that it will in future 
be prepared to use lethal force against terrorist suspects abroad even outside armed 
conflict.10 The Government set out its position in a four-page Memorandum, criticised 
in the Report as an inadequate response to the Committee’s detailed questions.11 The 
Memorandum is indeed an unimpressive document. The Committee said “We are 
disappointed by the Government’s unhelpfulness in this respect. . . Considerations of 
transparency and democratic accountability require the Government to explain 
publicly its understanding of the legal basis on which it takes action which so seriously 
affects fundamental rights.”12 
In its evidence to the Committee, the Government expressly denied that it had a 
policy of targeted killing. Its official position in the past, like that of the EU, had been 
to reject the legality of extra-judicial killing.13 The RAF did not carry out drone attacks 
outside hot battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, there was some 
ambivalence in the UK’s position. There were convincing newspaper reports that it 
had provided intelligence and drone parts to the USA,14 and that it had embedded 
pilots with US drone teams carrying out CIA drone strikes.15 Accordingly the 
Committee in its Report calls on the Government to clarify the legal basis for its 
support to the USA.16 Although the UK Defence Committee had said that it was 
necessary to draw a clear distinction between the UK’s use of drones and that of the 
USA,17 the UK was not willing to criticise US targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia. It did not comment on the legality of the covert campaigns of the CIA 
outside hot battlefields. When the UK Government was pressed to take a public 
position, it consistently said only that US drone strikes against terrorist targets in 
Pakistan and Yemen were “a matter for the states involved”.18  
When President Obama’s administration set out a framework for its extensive 
targeted killing programme in a series of speeches, they acknowledged that their 
closest allies followed a different approach.19 Whereas the USA took the position that 
since 9/11 it was involved in an ongoing armed conflict with AlQaida and its affiliates 
and did not have to show that each individual targeted killing was justified as 
self-defence, in contrast the allies operated on a case by case basis. For them an 
individual US targeted killing outside hot battlefields could be justified as self-defence 
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if it targeted AlQaida members who were “planning, engaging in or threatening an 
armed attack”. The clear implication was that the allies accepted that targeted killing  
outside armed conflict could be lawful self-defence, although they did not publicly put 
forward such a position at the time.20  
The Committee said that it understood the UK Government’s reluctance to describe 
its policy as one of “targeted killing”. The term was a sensitive one. However, as a 
matter of substance the Committee found that the Government is now willing to use 
lethal force abroad outside armed conflict, against individuals suspected of planning 
an imminent terrorist attack against the UK, as a last resort, when there is no other way 
of preventing the attack.21 This was in substance a new policy, even if the Government 
was not happy to put it forward as such. The policy was set out in the Government’s 
Memorandum, and confirmed by Ministerial statements and evidence to Parliamentary 
Committees.22 The Prime Minister had set out the legal basis for the drone strike 
against Reyaad Khan in his 7 September 2015 statement to the House of Commons. It 
was an act of self-defence to protect the British people. Reyaad Khan had been 
involved in actively recruiting ISIL sympathisers and seeking to orchestrate specific 
and barbaric attacks against the West, including directing a number of planned 
terrorist attacks in Britain, such as attacks on high profile public commemorations in 
May and June 2015.23 The UK was acting in exercise of its inherent right to 
self-defence. It had acted because there was no alternative: in the absence of a Syrian 
government that it would work with and no military forces on the ground, direct action 
was the only way of preventing Khan’s planned attacks on the UK.24 The Attorney 
General had advised that there was a clear basis in international law.25 It was the UK’s 
right to take necessary and proportionate action to defend itself against terrorist attack. 
The strike was to defend the British people against the threat of terrorist attack in the 
UK.  
The Prime Minister had made it clear that the particular targeted killing was part of 
a wider counter-terrorism strategy, and that the UK’s policy of “lethal action” 
extended to areas outside armed conflict.  He said that he would always be prepared 
to take immediate action to stop a direct threat to the British people, “whether the 
threat is emanating from Libya, from Syria or from anywhere else.”26 The action taken 
on 21 August 2015 was not a one-off. This was confirmed by the Secretary of State for 
Defence in his statements to the Committee.27 He said, “If there is a direct and 
imminent threat to the UK and there is no other way of dealing with it . . . then of 
course as a last resort we have to use force.” He confirmed that it was the 
government’s policy to use lethal force abroad outside armed conflict. Moreover, the 
UK allows its bases to be used for US air strikes on ISIL training camps in Libya, 
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outside an armed conflict to which the UK is a party. Cumulatively these statements 
and this practice demonstrated to the Committee’s satisfaction that the UK had now 
adopted a new policy with regard to targeted killing, whatever it was to be called. Its 
policy on the use of force outside areas of armed conflict did contemplate the 
possibility of pre-identified individuals being killed by the State to prevent a terrorist 
attack.28  
The Committee noted that the UK’s apparent change of policy had not been 
preceded by any parliamentary scrutiny or debate and that the Government had not 
published any formulated policy.29 There was now considerable uncertainty about 
what the Government’s policy was, and a lack of clarity about the legal basis of that 
policy.  The Government had invoked the international law of self-defence, but had 
said very little about whether the Law of War or human rights were also relevant and, 
if so, what they required.  In spite of these criticisms, the Committee seemed broadly 
sympathetic to the Government’s position on self-defence.30 Although the Committee 
acknowledged that it was not clearly settled in international law whether there is a 
right of self-defence against a threat of armed attack by non-state actors who are not 
acting under the control or direction of another state, it accepted the wide view put 
forward by the Government on this issue.31 Its Report asserts that state practice 
“certainly accepts this right”, and that Security Council Resolution 2249 “lends 
support to this view”. However, both these assertions are still controversial, as is the 
Report’s apparent acceptance of the necessity of targeted killing when the host state is 
“unwilling or unable” to prevent attacks.32 The Report also accepted the statement in 
the Government’s Memorandum that an ongoing series of terrorist attacks may rise to 
the level of an armed attack against the UK that justifies the use of force to counter it 
in accordance with Article 51 if they are of sufficient gravity.33 However, the 
Committee was more sceptical about the Government’s argument for a flexible 
interpretation of the requirement of an “imminent” armed attack.34  
Perhaps not surprisingly, as the basis for its new policy the UK Government now 
seems to adopt the controversial doctrine of self-defence promulgated by Daniel 
Bethlehem, former FCO Legal Adviser after he stepped down from his position.35 As 
he himself acknowledged, the doctrine he put forward was not fully worked out. The 
Government’s position also needs further elaboration. If the technology of drone 
warfare now allows the UK to take lethal action against suspected terrorists abroad 
outside armed conflict, more detailed explanation of the new policy identified by the 
Committee is needed. In particular the Government’s apparent position that it is the 
Law of Armed Conflict rather than human rights law that governs such killings needs 
further justification. This new policy has been adopted at a time when there is a 
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concerted attempt to widen the right of self-defence, apparent in the communications 
of western states to the Security Council with regard to military action against ISIL in 
Syria. It also comes at a time when more states and armed groups are acquiring the 
technology to carry out attacks by armed drones. There have been many warnings of 
the precedential impact of targeted killings. The Committee accordingly urged the 
Government not to try to develop a doctrine unilaterally, but to take part in 
international efforts to this end.36 
Those who are concerned about the legality and effectiveness of targeted killing by 
drones as a response to terrorist attacks  - those who see drone attacks outside armed 
conflict as constituting punitive and/or preventive action rather than self-defence 
under international law - may perhaps take some comfort from the fact that the 
Government was reluctant openly to avow such a policy, and that it preferred to claim 
that its killing of Reyaad Khan was not a new departure, despite the language of the 
Prime Minister. The Committee welcomed the Government’s recognition that the use 
of legal force abroad outside armed conflict should only ever be exceptional.37 There 
have not, as far as we know, been any further UK targeted killings outside armed 
conflict to date. However, the reports of the existence of a UK kill list are not 
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